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Abstract –Guaranteed response time of a control system 
is a primary assumption for correct function of the 
system. This parameter is ever more important in case of 
a safety related control systems (SRCS). We have to 
determine a maximal response time of the realised safety 
functions to reach required safety parameters (it means 
that we have to assume the worst case of SRCS 
behaviour). This time depends not only on parameters of 
the SRCS but also on its architecture. This paper deals 
with influence of the above mentioned factors to response 
time of safety functions realised by a decentralised SRCS. 
Keywords - response time; safety PLC; SRCS; safety 
function 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Safety PLCs are common used for realisation of 
safety related control systems (SRCS). The safety PLCs 
are primary intended for industrial applications, but 
their use can be found in transport applications (for 
example: MODEST system from the company  
1. Signální, ELEKSA system from Siemens, the SPA 4 
system from Bombardier Corporate, etc.). We have to 
guarantee required safety integrity level (SIL) of 
realised safety function (SF) or functions (SFs)  
for every application. Safety integrity of hardware 
can be provided by suitable hardware components, 
architecture and diagnostics. Systematic safety  
integrity is possible to be provide by using methods that  
minimize systematic failure occurrence when we 
design the system [3]. 
For design of SRCS which realises SF or SFs with 
required SIL it is necessary to create a detailed 
specification which includes the description of their 
function and response time of every SF realised by 
SRCS. Because the response time of SF is dependent 
on the SRCS architecture, it is necessary to adapt this 
architecture in some case. We must also remember that 
architecture adaptation can worsen hardware safety 
integrity which must not exceed maximal tolerable 
level. 
Response time will be longer in case that SF is 
realised by a decentralised SRCS. It is caused, besides 
other thing, by communication among decentralised 
parts of SRCS and degree of decentralisation which can 
causes longer delays. Influence of safety related 
communication is detailed described in [4, 5, 6]. 
This paper analyses influence of some decentralised 
architectures of SRCS on response time of realised SF.  
II. RESPONSE TIME 
From a comprehensive point of view on the 
controlled system we have to assume that response time 
of safety function is the time from dangerous event 
occurrence until the controlled system gets into a safe 
state. 
For mechanical devices with moving parts it is the 
time from sensor detection (for example light curtain, 
emergency stop button, etc.) to safe state (stop or slow 
down moving parts). Standard [7] defines an overall 
system stopping performance (total time to system stop) 
by formula: 
ݐௌிெ = ݐௌோ஼ௌ + ݐெ, (1)
where ݐௌிெ is an overall system stopping performance, ݐௌோ஼ௌ is a response time of SRCS and ݐெ is a maximal 
time to termination of the dangerous function of the 
machine after the stop command is issued. Time ݐெ can 
be significantly affected by inertia of the machine´s 
moving parts. 
Distance ݈ between a sensor, which detects peoples 
entrance, and the potentially dangerous zone must be: 
݈ ≥ ݒ௠௔௫. ݐௌிெ, (2)
where ݒ௠௔௫  is a maximal assumed speed of the person 
(or part of body). 
In industrial processes it is unlikely for the moving 
parts of the mechanical devices to be the source of the 
source of potential danger, which usually is the 
controlled process (for example a chemical reaction). In 
this case the following must apply (according to [8]): 
ݐௌி௉ ≤ ݐ௠௔௫, (3)
where ݐ௠௔௫  is the maximal admissible time of 
controlled process to reach a safe state. Response time 
of safety function is possible to be described similarly 
as response time of mechanical devices. We can divide 
this time into two parts: 
ݐௌி௉ = ݐௌோ஼ௌ + ݐ௉, (4)
where ݐ௉ is a maximal time of reaching safe state of the 
controlled process. 
The response time of a safety function (formula (1) 
and (4)) is a part of the industrial process control 
regardless of the controlled process. 
 A. Response time of centralised SRCS 
Response time for centralised SRCS can be 
described as: 
ݐௌோ஼ௌ = ݐௌ + ݐ௦௉௅஼ + ݐ஺, (5)
where ݐௌ is sensor (or sensors) response time, ݐ௦௉௅஼ is 
response time of safety PLC and ݐ஺ is an actuator (or 
actuators) response time. 
Response time values of sensors and actuators must 
be determined by manufacturer. Safety PLC is a 
modular system, which can be composed from different 
parts. Every part of the system can influence the 
response time of safety PLC. Parameters of safety PLC 
modules and their influence on response time of SF are 
detailed described by [9].  
B. Response time of decentralised SRCS 
Unlike the centralised SRCS in a decentralised 
SRCS we have to assume communication time 
influence on the response time of SRCS. We can 
describe this time for decentralised SRCS by formula: 
 ݐௗௌோ஼ௌ = ∑ ݐ௜௡௜ୀଵ + ݇. ݐ௖௢௠, (6)
where ݐௗௌோ஼ௌ is a response time of distributed SRCS, ݐ௜ 
is a response time of hardware components which 
provide safety function by distributed SRCS, n is a 
components count, ݐ௖௢௠  is communication time 
between two parts of SRCS and k is a count of 
sequential two bounds transfer for SF realisation. 
We cannot neglect communication time of 
decentralised SRCS (regardless of today´s high speed 
industrial networks) because application protocols are 
used for safety related communication. These protocols 
process data in an application program, which means 
that communication speed is not depend on cycle of 
data transfer via communication network only, but it 
also strongly depends on time period of application 
program. We can explain this issue on an example 
below. 
Let´s assume that SF is realised by two safety PLCs, 
sensor S and actuators A1 and A2 (fig. 1). Safety PLC1 
(sPLC1) monitors people entry by sensor S. In case of 
people entry detection, information is send to a safety 
PLC2 (sPLC2), which processes this information and 
changes state of actuator A2. Then sPLC2 sends 
information about state change of actuator A2 to safety 
PLC1. When sPLC1 receive this information, it will 
change state of actuator A1. We assume that safety 
function was executed when state of both actuators was 
changed after entry detection. 
We can determine response time of SF by formula 
(6), where ݇ = 2. Communication time (ݐ௖௢௠) depends 
on: 
• used instruction sequence in safety program; 
• period of operating cycle execution of safety PLC1 
and safety PLC2; 
• watchdog timer values of safety PLC1 and safety 
PLC2; 
• phase shift between operating cycles of safety PLC1 
and safety PLC2 (phase shift can be variable in 
time); 
 
• scale of safety programs; 
• communication bus speed. 
 
Figure 1.  Safety function realised by simple decentralised SRCS 
We can influence some of these factors (for 
example: sequence of safety program instructions). 
Other factors have to be assumed for the worst case, 
which can occur during lifetime of SRCS (for example: 
phase shift between operating cycle of sPLC1 and 
sPLC2). 
 
Figure 2.  Execution of SF by simple decentralised SRCS 
In the Fig. 2 we can see representation of safety 
function execution (from detection by sensor to state 
change of actuator A1) in case of optimal controlled 
instructions of safety program. In the fig. 2 we can see 
parts of safety program which are marked by numbers. 
Time sequence of execution parts of the program is 
shown in the graph. If an event occurred, the 
information about sensor state is transmitted to PLC2 as 
soon as next safety program is executed (OC2 of safety 
PLC1). sPLC2 receives this information, process it and 
send to safety PLC1 during one operating cycle (OC2 of 
the safety PLC2). Safety PLC1 changes state of actuator 
A1 after it receives information from sPLC2 (during 
operating cycle OC3). 
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 III. APPLICATION EXAMPLE 
Text above shows that architecture of decentralised 
SRCS has a significant influence on response time. This 
is mainly caused by important communication among 
parts of SRCS. This fact is described on an example 
below. 
We assume that production line consists of three 
cells which do sequential tasks (every product 
eventually goes through every cell). Each cell is 
equipped by a safety PLC, which provides safety 
functions. Product line can also be operated by a 
wireless control panel (OP). 
We will assume this definition of safety functions: 
Name Safety function 
F1 First cell has to stop execution of operation 
after emergency stop button ES1 is 
pressed. 
F2 First and second cell have to stop execute 
operations after press emergency stop 
button ES2. 
F3 All cells have to stop executing of 
operations after emergency stop button 
ES3 is pressed. 
F4 All cells have to stop execution of 
operations after emergency stop button 
ES4, which is situated on wireless control 
panel, is pressed.  
 
With respect to scope of this paper, only emergency 
stop functions of the production line (or its parts) will 
be discussed further. These emergency stops will occur 
after emergency stop button is pushed. Of course, the 
conclusions of this example can be generalized for any 
other safety functions. 
Mentioned SFs can be realised by different 
architectures of SRCS. Architecture of SRCS depends 
not only on realised SF, but also on usage of safety PLC 
for realisation of common control functions (functions 
not relevant for safety; safety PLC can work in parallel 
as a standard PLC for realisation of other complex 
functions, for example [10]). Two different 
architectures of decentralised SRCS, which can be used 
to realise said SFs, are shown in fig. 3 and fig. 4.  
When we evaluate response time of safety 
functions, it is necessary to take into account that safety 
communication is possible only between two devices 
(model producent-consument is not supported). 
Therefore, from a safety relevant communication point 
of view, not only the network topology but primarily 
the configuration and programming of logical relations. 
These relations usually depend on safety PLC 
manufacturer and used hardware components. Safety 
relevant communication between device couples are 
represented in the fig.3 and fig.4 by arrows with dashed 
lines. 
 
Figure 3.  Production line with one- level decentralised SRCS 
 
Figure 4.  Production line and two-level decentralised SRCS 
A. Influence of architecture of decentralised SRCS on 
real response time of safety functions 
Response time of SFs realised by decentralised 
SRCS was measured under the following assumptions:  
• safety PLC used for realisation of decentralised 
SRCS (fig. 3 and fig. 4) are from series Simatic S7-
1500 (F-CPU 1516F-3PN/DP) and ET200SP (F-DI 
8x24VDC, F-DO 4x24VDC/2A); 
• used parameters of each modules of safety PLC are 
equal for every together related measured case (with 
respect to scope of this paper, detailed parameters 
are not included); 
• sensors, actuators and product lines response times 
are not included in measured SFs response time of 
SRCS (excluded time parameters are independent 
on watched properties – influence of architecture 
and parameters of safety PLC on SFs response 
time). 
Measured response times of SFs are shown in tab. 1 
(all times are stated in ms). This table shows measured 
response times for architectures shown in fig. 3  
and fig. 4. On the left side of the table we can see SFs 
response times for these architectures when 
manufacturer pre-set (default) values are used. The 
right side of the table shows measured response times 
for the same architectures in case of using optimised 
values compliant with [9]. Because the response time is 
variable, for each case a set of 10 measurements was 
conducted. Tab. 1 shows the average and maximal 
measured values.
sPLC1 sPLC2 sPLC3
OP 
ES1 ES2 
Cell no. 2 Cell no. 3
ES3
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Cell no. 1
Bunka 1 
sPLC1 sPLC2 sPLC3
OP
sPLC4 
ES1 ES2 
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ES3
ES4
 TABLE I.  RESPONSE TIME OF SFS – MEASURED VALUES 
SF 
[ms] 
Preset values of sPLC Optimalised parameters of sPLC 
fig. 3 fig. 4 fig. 3 fig. 4 
avg max avg max avg max avg max
F1 97 131 84,8 128 32,9 39 28,7 34 
F2 129,2 190 168,2 220 34,2 37 35,4 44 
F3 169,9 201 227 258 40 46 35,7 41 
F4 158,4 208 109,9 158 37,4 45 23,6 28 
B. Influence of architecture of decentralised SRCS on 
maximal response time of safety functions 
It is evident (based on tab. 1) that architecture of 
decentralised SRCS and parameters optimalisation has 
influence on SFs response time. From the safety point 
of view, we cannot calculate with measured SFs 
response times because these times do not represent the 
worst possible case (for example we cannot assume 
measured response times to determine distance 
according to (2)). It is not possible to determine the 
worst case by measuring because we have to take into 
an account many different factors and their 
combinations which have influence on the response 
time. Some of factors with influence on response time 
can be simulated, but simulation of their combination is 
very difficult (or impossible). Therefore, response time 
has to be determined by theoretical analysis.  
Maximal SFs response times for decentralised 
SRCS, which were shown in fig. 3 and fig. 4, are shown 
in the tab. 2 (all values are in milliseconds and 
determined by theoretical analysis by [11]).  
TABLE II.  MAXIMAL RESPONSE TIME OF SFS 
SF 
[ms] 
Preset values of 
sPLC 
Optimalied parameters of 
sPLC 
fig. 3 fig. 4 fig. 3 fig. 4 
F1 174 154 61 60 
F2 298 558 72 93 
F3 364 558 85 93 
F4 364 452 85 80 
IV. EVALUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In the tab. 2 we can see longer maximal response 
time of SFs – F2, F3 and F4 (safety functions which 
require safety relevant communication) in case of two 
level decentralised SRCS (fig. 4). The reason is, that for 
these safety functions, safety relevant communication 
has to run two times. For example: for realisation F3 it 
is necessary to send information about ES3 state change 
to sPLC4 and then send from sPLC4 to sPLC1 and 
sPLC2. Communication from sPLC4 to sPLC1 and 
sPLC2 can be parallel, but to determine maximal 
response time we have to assume the worst possible 
case – the biggest time shift among operating cycle 
starts of each safety PLC. This is one of the reasons, 
why the real response time (tab. 1) and maximal 
response time (tab. 2) are so different. 
One solution how to reduce maximal response time 
is making a new relation among sPLC. For example: in 
case of existing relation between sPLC3 and sPLC1 and 
also relation between sPLC3 and sPLC2 (fig.4), 
information about ES3 change state could be send 
directly without mediated communication via sPLC4. 
We also have to assume other impacts of this solution. 
One of the impacts is longer safety program execution 
(secondary impact is again prolongation of response 
time) and, depending on a manufacturer, it could 
require addition of new hardware components (which 
are necessary for safety relevant communication). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Generally, it can be said that higher complexity of 
SRCS raises the response time of safety functions. This 
time can be reduced by changing the architecture or 
parameters optimisation for individual sPLC. With 
respect to the fact, that architecture of SRCS is not only 
dependant on safety function realisation, but also on 
common control functions realised by the same PLC for 
better utilization of the sPLC, then parameters 
optimisation is the better option. This paper shows the 
possibility to significantly reduce response time of 
safety functions without SRCS architecture 
modification thanks to parameters optimalisation of 
safety PLC. 
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